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JANET L. BORGERSON
I
 
f business requires ethical solutions that are viable in the liminal
landscape between concepts and corporate office, then business
ethics and corporate social responsibility should offer tools that
can survive the trek, that flourish in this well-traveled, but often
unarticulated environment. Feminist ethics has preceded business
ethics and corporate social responsibility into crucial domains that
these fields now seek to engage. Indeed, feminist ethics has developed
theoretical and conceptual resources for mapping, investigating,
and comprehending these complex, often undefined, realms and,
moreover, greeting and communicating with the diverse human
beings who make their lives there. Nevertheless, feminist ethics
has been consistently overlooked, misunderstood, and improperly
applied within business ethics and corporate social responsibility.
This article provides conceptual clarification, illustrative examples,
and furthermore develops a framework for future research.
This article demonstrates that the common and consistent fail-
ure in the business ethics context to make basic differentiations
between 
 
feminist
 
 and 
 
feminine
 
 ethics, as well as conflating feminist
ethics with care ethics has resulted in misapprehension, theoretical
misunderstanding, and, most importantly, missed opportunities to
benefit from feminist ethics’ extensive and flexible assets. “Feminist
ethics,” “feminine ethics,” and “care ethics” each designates poten-
tially fertile, yet at times wholly discrete, realms of philosophical
insight. Crucial and fundamental discord exists among them.
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I argue that feminist ethics has yet to live up to its potential in
business ethics and corporate social responsibility in part because
many researchers in these fields have failed to recognize four key points:
1. Feminist ethics and feminine ethics are different;
2. All versions of care ethics are 
 
not
 
 founded upon feminine traits
and characteristics;
3. Care ethics and feminist ethics are different; and
4. Feminist ethics is not merely a version of “postmodern ethics.”
Whereas confusion remains around these four basic points in the
business ethics literature, a scholarly search can reveal numerous
publications over the decades that have clearly differentiated, distin-
guished, and mobilized the discreet potentials of the diverse positions
(e.g., Borgerson 2001; 2005b; Derry 2002; McNay 2000; Noddings
1984; Nunner-Winkler 1993; Tong 1997; Tronto 1993; Whitbeck 1983).
Whereas aspects of care ethics and feminine ethics arguably have
potential contributions to make in business ethics research (White
1998), the focus of this essay will remain on 
 
feminist
 
 ethics to eluci-
date potential resources for business ethics. Throughout the course
of this article, I address each misunderstanding in turn in hopes of
providing a more accurate and useful rendering of feminist ethics.
After presenting the philosophical background of feminist ethics
and feminist ethical theory, I illustrate the four misunderstandings,
including a textbook case of the misrepresentation and under-
estimation of feminist ethics within the domain of business ethics.
Then, to begin expressing the harmony of feminist and business
ethics, I discuss crucial intersections of interest emerging around
concepts of 
 
relationships
 
, 
 
responsibility
 
, and 
 
experience
 
. A research
example demonstrates how feminist ethical awareness intervenes
in business ethics research, countering the tendency to employ
“gender differences” in the study of “ethical sensitivity”—defined as
“an ability to recognize that a particular situation poses an ethical
dilemma,” and exemplifies intolerance toward unethical behaviors,
and a proneness to do the right thing (Collins 2000: 6). In conclu-
sion, I provide examples of three feminist ethicists “in action” whose
investigations into (1) the “grey zones” of harms; (2) identity and
representational conventions; and (3) the enlarging potential of
“asymmetrical reciprocity” provide insight into feminist ethics’ ana-
lytic power. First, however, I ask “Why feminist ethics?” and provide
an orientation regarding this article’s theoretical sympathies.
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WHY FEMINIST ETHICS?
 
Feminist ethics calls attention to relationships, responsibility, and
experience and their cultural, historical, and psychologic contexts.
Strikingly, whereas compelling business ethics scenarios often call
for experience in the organization and engagement with the context
at hand, traditional ethical considerations that aim at versions
of principle-based objectivity and universality often judge such
experience and attention “inappropriately subjective” or “unworthy
of consideration” in solving problems and coming to terms with
conflicts of interest. In other words, a gulf sometimes emerges
between business ethics discussions and the way dilemmas are
actually resolved.
Moreover, in much ethical discourse, notions of responsibility
typically function in reference to fulfilling—usually abstract—
duties and obligations provoking scarce investigation into the
implied relations. The importance of relationships, or sociality, lies
at the core of business organization and practices. Nevertheless,
responsibility’s more comprehensive and insightful modes—as a
context for agency based in relationships, developed and borne out
intersubjectively or in conjunction with others—have little hope of
emerging within traditional discussions of business ethics and
corporate social responsibility, yet become apparent readily in
feminist ethics.
The field of feminist ethics simultaneously draws upon and
develops theoretical foundations that question and pose alterna-
tives to traditional ontological and epistemological assumptions.
Fundamental reflection unveils productive possibilities. To put this
another way, feminist ethics engages broad concerns of interest,
motivating powerful and novel ways of thinking and, furthermore
providing diverse approaches to central issues in business ethics
and corporate social responsibility (e.g., Calás and Smircich 1997;
Derry 2002). In extending the context for feminist ethical inter-
ventions in the areas of business ethics and corporate social
responsibility, this essay animates key concepts derived from
feminist ethics, and reveals that—far from being limited to dis-
cussions based in gender differences—feminist ethics provides
pathways for recognizing, evaluating, and addressing ethical
problems generally.
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ORIENTING THEORETICAL SYMPATHIES
 
Echoing Rosemarie Tong’s concerns for bioethics, if business ethics
does not want to become “just a subfield of law—another rule, reg-
ulation and policy generating enterprise,” if it wants to encourage
and support investigation of and interventions in difficult ethical
questions and conflicts, then “it must make some changes” (Tong
1996: 89). This article is informed by analytic philosophy, including
analytic philosophers’ work in feminist ethics, but also in some
respects by philosophical work in existential phenomenology. As
this term may appear unfamiliar to some, let us define it. 
 
Phenome-
nology
 
, as the study of the movement of consciousness through
time—including 
 
the way things appear to us
 
—becomes 
 
existential
 
with an emphasis upon understanding diversities of human
experience in the world, including notions of lived experiences’
contingency and uncertainty. Moreover, the body and particular
conditions of embodiment become lenses for comprehending
intersubjectivity, engagement, and relations with others. In short,
this article explores the harmony of feminist ethics and business
ethics, mobilizing an existential–phenomenological perspective,
broadly conceived.
A number of prejudices and habits of thinking may lurk in
business ethics’ philosophical background—militating against
opportunities for Tong’s called-for “changes”—and influential Oxford
philosopher G. J. Warnock provides a relevant example. In his
entertaining commentary on what he undoubtedly views as
unfortunate Hegelian influences on late 19th-century English
philosophy, Warnock (1969) insists that most people are 
 
not
 
wracked with existential concerns, such as how to live. He writes,
“to practice philosophy in the manner of [G. E.] Moore, it is not
necessary to have (as most of us doubtless have not) nor pretend
to have (as some at least would be unwilling to do) large-scale
metaphysical anxieties. It is necessary only to want to get things
clear” (Warnock 1969: 42). Clarity, seemingly, is not what Warnock
found in Hegel—an influential theorist in existential phenomenology’s
background; apparently “large-scale metaphysical anxieties” are
not only rare, but also decidedly pretentious distractions in “real”
philosophy.
Animating a prominent philosophical brand as Warnock does
here calls attention to the delineation of philosophical questions,
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including the kinds of questions philosophy—and as a result, philo-
sophically informed business ethics—has the potential, or inclination,
to raise. This is not to say that analytic philosophy will take busi-
ness ethics and corporate social responsibility down a dead-end
road. However, the particular resources displayed thus far arguably
have been unsuccessful in wresting business ethics and corporate
social responsibility away from those who would indeed turn them
into a “rule, regulation, and policy generating exercise.” Perhaps if these
fields are to flourish and philosophy is to play a part, then turning
to alternative perspectives such as feminist ethics and, moreover,
remaining open to the potential of an existential phenomenological
perspective, offer a productive opportunity as the impact of global
business and corporate social responsibility continues to grow.
 
FEMINIST ETHICS: ACCESSING THE FIELD
 
Feminist ethics places the tendency to value connection—and demon-
strate alternatives to traditional notions of autonomy—outside con-
ventional visions of a natural or an essential female-gender–based
way of being in the world. Feminist ethics turns instead to concrete
and particular, yet theoretically elaborated, cultural and historical
understandings of diverse marginal or subordinated groups’ experience.
Furthermore, tendency to critical inquiry, especially regarding
the frequently forgone “givens” of particular situations marks femi-
nist ethics 
 
not
 
 as a list of essential sex-based ethically relevant
traits or a set of predetermined gender-based applicable principles,
but rather as an intervention that calls for active engagement in
dilemmas. The following sections elaborate on important aspects
of feminist ethics, including a brief discussion of the distinction
between sex (female) and gender (feminine).
 
Feminist Interventions and Investigations
 
Feminist ethics states a motive for investigating the ethics of
an ethos itself. The word ethic, derived from the Greek 
 
ethos
 
, refers
to the disposition, character, or fundamental value peculiar to a
specific person, people, culture, or movement, and usually is con-
ceived of as a set of principles of right conduct or a theory or system
of moral values. Feminist ethicists have insisted that “The process
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by which a community arrives at its standards or moral norms is
itself open to moral scrutiny” (Brennan 1999: 864), forcing atten-
tion upon the context and structure of moral reflection and judg-
ment and attending to signs of oppression. Such an understanding
clearly evokes an array of questions: How does an ethos make itself
known? How is the ethos experienced in day to day life? Or in law?
Why do some people or groups have one ethos rather than another?
Claudia Card, articulating the work of feminist ethics, writes,
“oppressive sexual politics sets the stage for ethical inquiries into
character, interpersonal relationships, emotional response, and
choice in persistently stressful, damaging contexts” (Card 1991: 5).
In other words, the systematically subordinated positions in which
women have found themselves—throughout global history—provoke
a range of ethical investigations.
In addition, the concerns of feminist ethics exceed women’s
oppression and engage the welfare of other groups as well. Feminist
ethics often operates against the backdrop of traditional ethical theo-
ries’ marginalization of females generally. However, feminist ethics
articulates, theorizes, and works to understand modes of exclusion,
subordination, and oppression—and the damage inflicted by these
processes and practices. And, clearly, females have not been the
only segment, nor the private domestic sphere the only arena,
marginalized or excluded from the traditional vision of moral theory
(Tong 1993: 224). Indeed, as Alison Jaggar argues, the concepts of
traditional moral theory were often “ill-suited to the contexts under
discussion,” failing to account for the experience of many within
those contexts (Brennan 1999: 861). Moreover, writes Susan
Sherwin, “feminist ethics proposes that when we engage in moral
deliberation, it is not sufficient just to calculate utilities or to follow
a set of moral principles. We must also ask whose happiness is
increased, or how the principles in question affect those who are
now oppressed in the circumstances at hand” (Sherwin 1996: 52).
In short, feminist ethics pays attention to who tends to benefit
from a particular way of viewing, evaluating, and philosophizing
about the world, and who tends to bear the burden.
 
Recognizing the Sex/Gender Distinction
 
A fundamental theoretical issue must be recognized in this discus-
sion, that is, the distinction between sex and gender. By marking
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the sex/gender distinction, it becomes clear in what ways a “female”
perspective differs from a “feminist” perspective. Moreover, a proponent
of “care” ethics may distinguish some aspects of care from stereo-
typically articulated “feminine,” self-sacrificing caring behaviors, yet
nevertheless not take on board a feminist perspective. “Gender” is
“used as an analytic category to draw a line of demarcation between
biological sex differences and the way these are used to inform
behaviors or competencies, which are then assigned as either
‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’ ” (Pilcher and Whelehan 2004: 56). To put
this another way, behaviors and traits associated with females are
often termed “feminine”; in turn, males’ characteristics and behaviors
are often termed “masculine.” Yet it is clear that masculine and
feminine traits are not necessarily connected to males or females.
Stereotypically masculine traits can be prominent in females,
and stereotypically feminine traits can describe certain gestures in
males. Indeed, many traits and behaviors said to be masculine or
feminine have no “natural” or essential connection to either sexed
body. Rather, it could be said that male and female human beings
learn and adopt these gendered traits, behaviors, and roles depend-
ing on the social and cultural requirements of their families, com-
munities, and cultures at particular points in history. Moreover,
whereas a color such as blue can be “gendered” masculine, this is
not a claim that blue is a naturally “male” color.
The distinction between sex and gender allows researchers to
separate biological sex difference from traits and characteristics
that are often stereotypically gendered. Thus, feminist ethics claims
that self-sacrificing caring traits are not naturally occurring female
traits, but rather that females in certain places and at certain times
for various reasons have had self-sacrificing caring traits forced
upon them as appropriate to their sex. As these traits and concom-
itant roles are enforced and modeled in female lives, the traits and
roles are said to be “natural,” an essential part of being female. The
concerns with naturalizing traits and roles that damage human
lives and the connection of this with feminist ethics will be explored
in depth below.
 
Differentiating Feminist Ethics and Care Ethics
 
Let us explore more specifically the way in which care ethics and the
feminine-trait–based ethical positions that followed (e.g., Noddings
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1984; Ruddick 1989) diverge from feminist ethics. Tong succinctly
articulates the distinction that has emerged between feminist ethics
and versions of care ethics: “any approach to ethics so naïve as to
celebrate the value of caring without caring who cares for whom is
not feminist” (Tong 1996: 72). Given the common erroneous sense
that feminist ethics 
 
is
 
 care ethics, and given the goal of this essay, it
will be useful to explicitly differentiate the positions here.
Psychologist Carol Gilligan, routinely recognized as a forerunner
in feminist ethics, remains a relevant, though troubled starting
point (e.g., White 1998: 11). Focused upon moral development—as
exhibited in decision making around ethical dilemmas—Gilligan’s
research challenged attributions of moral superiority usually
granted to those research subjects who solved the ethical dilemmas
by referring to abstract values derived from universal principles
(Gilligan 1982). Her work responded to psychologist Lawrence
Kohlberg’s influential hierarchical scale of moral maturity, based
in dominant Kantian notions of rational morality. Gilligan’s early
studies—of her subjects’ ethical deliberations—revealed “different”
approaches, perspectives, or voices, including a voice of “care,” that
defied abstract, universal positioning. Kohlberg’s scale would
judge them inferior, yet Gilligan argued that these voices deserved
recognition for mature moral reasoning: a care perspective was
different, yet equally capable of morally mature judgment.
These alternative ethical considerations—centered around values
of care and heard most often in Gilligan’s female subjects’ voices—
have been misapprehended as expressing an essentially female
ethos, or women’s natural way of being. In fact, Gilligan never
identified the caring voice with the voices of all, and only, women.
Whereas sexual dualism—the opposing and hierarchical ordering
of male and female—and female gender roles increase the likelihood
that a female “voice” expresses care, great variation persists in who
voices care and why.
In later research, Gilligan (1995) made a crucial distinction
between a feminine ethic and a feminist ethic. Conceptions of
femininity—understood theoretically as the subordinated element
in the gender dualism masculinity/femininity—carry meanings
derived from often associated essentialized female traits, such as
passivity, irrationality, and desire to nurture even at the expense of
self. A 
 
feminine
 
 ethic in a patriarchal social order is an ethic of
“special obligations and interpersonal relationships.” Gilligan writes,
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“Selflessness or self-sacrifice is built into the very definition of care
when caring is premised on an opposition between relationships
and self-development” (Gilligan 1995: 122). To put this another
way, a relationship informed by so-called feminine traits emerges as
fundamentally unequal—a one-sided concern with the well-being
and development of others that demands prior assumption of female
sacrifice made unproblematic by essentialist claims. In other
words, combining traditional modes of femininity with notions of
responsibility and caring puts into play a particularly debilitating
permutation of ethical agency, where agency is understood as
action that “transcends its material context” (McNay 2000: 22).
In short, the ability to act suffers under a feminine ethos, or a
feminized way of being.
Alternatively, by remaining reflective upon potential sites of
oppression and subordination, feminist ethical theory informs care
ethics’ focus on relation differently. A 
 
feminist
 
 ethic “begins with
connection, theorized as primary and seen as fundamental in
human life” (Gilligan 1995: 122). In this context, “disconnection”
and expectations of autonomy appear as problems. Such a perspec-
tive shares certain conceptual points with Emmanuel Levinas’
model of responsibility; but as I argue later, adaptations of Levinas’
ethical model often underestimate feminist ethics’ fundamental
contribution. Feminist ethics bears witness to intersubjectivity—or
the interrelatedness of subject positions—yet maintains or develops
“the capacity to manage actively the often discontinuous, over-
lapping or conflicting relations of power” (McNay 2000: 16–17).
Whereas some versions of care ethics take up this feminist
perspective, others do not. Sherwin (1996) writes, “some feminists
have argued that if we are to recommend a place for caring in eth-
ics, we do so only in conjunction with a political evaluation of the
role of caring in our moral deliberations, and others have rejected
caring outright as the central element of feminist ethics” (p. 51).
She continues, “I do not believe it is appropriate to characterize
the ethics of care as specifically feminist. It does not capture the
dimensions that I regard as distinctively feminist” (p. 51). Many, if
not most, researchers in feminist ethics concur with Sherwin, and
considerable work has been done to explicate precisely why this
is so. Hence, care ethics and feminist ethics are different, though at
times certain articulations of care ethics may express feminist
concerns.
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In attempting to bring together insights manifested in light of
such perspectives, focus and reflection on embodied experience of
marginalized existence often produce observations on—and new
understandings of—living with, enduring, and attempting to resist
forms of exclusion, subordination, and oppression; and further-
more may generate instances of previously unrecognized diversity
and variation, frequently evoking, demonstrating, and elaborating
alternative ontological and epistemological mappings that provoke
rethinking of typical mainstream understandings of meaning, being
interaction and theorizing itself. By motivating an investigation of
feminist ethics’ theoretical foundations, a stronger and expanded
contribution from feminist ethics will be forthcoming.
 
FEMINIST ETHICAL THEORY
 
Generally, feminist ethical theories are those that aim “to achieve a
theoretical understanding of women’s oppression with the purpose
of providing a route to ending women’s oppression [and] to develop
an account of morality which is based on women’s moral experi-
ence” in the sense that, previously, women’s experience has been
excluded (Brennan 1999: 860). However, this attempt to gather and
comprehend varieties of experience in particular contexts—that for-
merly remained beyond philosophical ethics’ consideration—is not
a claim about how women naturally, and hence necessarily, experi-
ence the world. Indeed, what we want to be cautious of in the
present endeavor is that “in our efforts to explain various realities
that are saturated with the weight of the interests that created
them, we often present ‘neat’ versions of reality to suit our agendas”
(Gordon 1995: 133).
Tong has condensed the most important feminist ethical con-
tributions into what she calls “challenges to the assumptions of
traditional ontology and epistemology” (Tong 1993: 49–77). Onto-
logically, the dualism of self versus other, or individual versus com-
munity—in which the discrete existence of each element is linked to
conceptions of autonomy—becomes a question of relationships
between self and other and responsibilities of self to the other, and
visa versa, in particular contexts. That is, feminist ethical theory
attempts to account for intersubjectivity, or interrelations be-
tween moral agents even as the boundaries between these become
 JANET L. BORGERSON 487
 
blurred. These interactions include situations of inequality and
power rather than contracts among assumedly equal partners. In
addition, traditional oppositions in epistemology such as abstract
versus concrete knowledge, universal versus particular stand-
points, impartial judgment versus partiality, and reason versus
emotion also fall under scrutiny.
The epistemological shifts in feminist ethical theory require a
sensibility that maintains a closer contact with practice and the
particular and, hence, remains receptive of concrete experience’s
details and insights. Investigations undertaken from a feminist
ethical perspective are less likely to accept elements and structures
of a dilemma as given. To put this another way, feminist ethical theo-
ries often spur expansion of the contexts in which problems are to
be understood, allowing a broader range of problem recognition,
possible solutions, and, moreover, preemptive work (see Dienhart
2000: 263; Weston 1992). So, for example, whereas research in
business ethics has explored the phenomenon of “ethical sensitivity”
(e.g., Collins 2000: 11) as a gender difference issue that expresses
aspects of apparently natural female, or sex-based, virtues, feminist
ethics refuses to essentialize, or treat as naturally occurring, so-
called women’s experience, thus provoking productively alternative
inquiries into “ethical sensitivity.” As Card argues, feminist ethics
calls upon us to interrogate the very occurrence and manifestation
of such “sensitivity.”
 
MISUNDERSTANDING FEMININST ETHICS: 
A TEXTBOOK CASE
 
The following discussion—focused on one main textual example—
illustrates the impetus to collapse the field of feminist ethics into a
“theory” that reduces to a common ontological trope of essentialized
female traits and characteristics assumedly drawn upon in ethical
“consideration.” 
 
Business Ethics
 
 (Crane and Matten 2004; 2007),
an influential business ethics textbook published by the prestigious
Oxford University Press, provides an obvious yet not inconsequential
site of analysis for relevant confusions regarding feminist ethics.
Interestingly, Fisher and Lovell’s textbook (2003) places a brief,
uncritical, yet reasonable discussion of care ethics under a broader
section on virtue ethics—pairing care with “wisdom” (pp. 74–75).
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Velasquez (2002) provides a superior discussion of care ethics in
his well-established textbook. Although he does not elaborate on
feminist ethics at all, he nevertheless provides an informed and
useful articulation of care ethics, which avoids conflating feminist
ethics and care ethics.
Although presenting the familiar ethical perspectives arguably
relevant for business ethics—utilitarianism and deontology—Crane
and Matten also include short sections on “virtue,” “feminist,” “dis-
course,” and “postmodern” ethics. Business ethics desperately needs
this augmentation. Nevertheless, the text inaccurately reduces
feminist ethics to “care ethics,” mistakenly grounds care ethics in
a “feminine approach,” and moreover states that a feminist ethical
perspective solves ethical problems by “intuition” and “personal,
subjective assessment” (Crane and Matten 2007: 112). Such a set
of misunderstandings and conceptual confusions explains much
about the remarkable underestimation of feminist ethics in busi-
ness ethics.
Feminist ethics, a field of philosophical research in itself,
appears somewhat misleadingly within both the first and second
editions of 
 
Business Ethics
 
 under the heading of “Contemporary
Ethical Theories” (Crane and Matten 2004: 95; 2007: 110)—
defined as those theories that include “consideration of decision-
makers, their context, and their relations with others as opposed to
just abstract universal principles” (2004: 95). In short, such a theory
would offer consideration for ethics emerging from concrete posi-
tions and particular situations rather than prescribe preordained
principles or duties in choosing or judging the good or right thing to
do. Thus, traditional ethical theories, and more recent versions
derived from them (e.g., Rawls 1971), are set against contemporary
ethical theories. Indeed, contemporary ethical theories often retain
aspirations for seeing the bigger picture yet at the same time, seri-
ously consider details that traditional ethics’ approaches have been
known to distain and disregard. Nevertheless, various contradic-
tions arise in attempting to generalize “effects” of a certain ethic,
or ethos, on all others and in all situations.
Moreover, this understanding obscures the provocative and fun-
damental tenuousness that feminist ethics locates in notions of
essentialism, necessity, and universality. In the wake of feminist
ethics’ ontological and epistemological shifts, the impact of such
essentialist assumptions would emerge as a site for critical analysis.
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In the short “Feminist Ethics” section (Crane & Matten 2004: 97–8;
2007: 111–113), “male approaches” are directly contrasted with
“feminist perspectives.” This ill-conceived opposition suggests a
lack of understanding around the distinction between sex and
gender basic to thinking in feminist theory and feminist ethics.
Employing coherent concepts in the explication of feminist ethics as
a contemporary ethical theory would require marking masculinity’s
distinction from the male and femininity’s distinction from the
female. Indeed, given that essentialist notions of “being” male or
female are rejected in feminist ethics, it is a theoretical error to
speak of a universally recognizable male or female mode of ethical
reflection, response, or action as the text does.
As discussed earlier, the “feminist” term in “feminist ethics”
designates a theoretical position distinct from both a “female” or
a “feminine” perspective. Indeed, a more accurate introduction to
feminist ethics would interrogate why aspects of stereotypical
femininity such as being passive, emotional, other-focused, or
“sensitive”—often expected of, imposed upon, and developed in
female bodies in certain groups, times, and places, including in
contemporary Western society—are more likely to coordinate
with and express a “care ethic,” than are corresponding “masculine”
aspects. This likelihood of embodied females taking on, exhibiting,
and acting out—often subordinating—feminine traits in a sexist
context is recognized as a problem with which feminist ethics has
been particularly concerned.
In addition, notions of female “intuition”—presented by the textbook
as a source of feminist ethics’ ethical response—reduce “feminist
ethics” to an informal process of applying feminized female common
sense. For example, “Feminism rather proposes a particular atti-
tude toward ethical conflicts that is more within the framework of
what women would allegedly do by intuition anyway” (Crane and
Matten 2007: 112). Of course, “feminism” does not concern only
women. Furthermore, this glaring gaffe marks a fundamental mis-
understanding and reiterates dualist notions of men as rational
and women as “intuitive.” As Jean Grimshaw puts it, “the view that
women do not act on principle, that they are intuitive and more
influenced by ‘personal’ considerations, has so often been used
in contexts where women have been seen as deficient that it is well
to be suspicious of any distinction between women and men
which seems to depend on this difference” (Grimshaw 1993: 43). This
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diminutive characterization exacerbates the underestimation of
feminist ethics. Moreover, as these misunderstandings have been
reproduced in the new edition of the textbook, the impact on students
and others who turn to this source will be witnessed for years
to come.
 
NOT ALL CARING RELATIONSHIPS ARE FEMINIST: 
FACING LEVINASIAN ETHICS
 
The debate over which characteristics are crucial for ethical agency,
including appropriate approaches to responsibility, has been
around for some time; yet the attempt to privilege so-called femi-
nine virtues, for example certain forms of “caring,” without careful
consideration of their context defies the wisdom of centuries of
antisexist work (Wollstonecraft 1975/1790; Young 1990: 73–91).
Feminist criticisms of feminine trait-based ethics have raised cru-
cial questions about damaging relationships, desirable boundaries,
and ethical agency under oppressive conditions (e.g., Borgerson
2001).
In Western patriarchal culture and in other cultures as well,
 
being
 
 has traditionally been divided into two. This binary mode has
given rise to well-recognized, hierarchically ordered dualisms of
meaning and being: the self/other, white/black, heaven/earth,
civilized/primitive, rational/irrational, finite/infinite dichotomies
that Val Plumwood finds implicated in the “logic of colonialism”
(1993: 51–55). The field of feminist ethics recognizes that processes
of ontological “othering” have perpetuated and reinforced histori-
cally evident privileging of the male, the white, and the rational
(Goldberg 1993).
Traditionally, philosophers have granted ethical superiority to
traits and behaviors arising from a stereotypically masculine way of
being. Kant, for example, in his 
 
Observations on the Feeling of the
Beautiful and the Sublime
 
 insists upon maintaining the “charming
distinction that nature has chosen to make between the two sorts of
human beings” (Kant 1960: 77). In this context, males exemplify
capacities for depth, abstract speculation, reason, universal
rules, and principles. Females are said to be modest, sympathetic,
sensitive, and capable of particular judgments, but not principles.
In Kant’s philosophical universe, this “charming distinction”
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leaves women unilaterally unable to attain full ethical agency.
Feminist ethics has attempted to confront the impact of such sexist
dualisms.
However, given this traditional underestimation, should not fem-
inist ethics welcome the opportunity to award female contributions
and feminine characteristics their long-overdue recognition of moral
or ethical worth? After all, the reevaluation of ghettoized caring
traits has opened up discussions of the role of care-taking and
relationships with others within ethics generally, including a
much-heralded challenge to notions of disembodied, contextless,
autonomous agents. Moreover, women’s experience of relation-
ships seems to suggest the permeable nature of boundaries
between individual beings, self, and other, pointing out possibili-
ties for communication between persons, rather than contracts
(Held 1993: 28).
Nevertheless, designations of “typical” feminine or masculine
habits of deliberation, no matter how apparently virtuous, maintain
a troublesome and damaging sexist dualism not extinguished even
as the value of traits shift. Socialized female and stereotypical
feminine traits have long been valued by philosophers as “charming
distinctions” appropriate to women’s ways of being, yet this valuing
has not changed the overall judgments of female ontological and
epistemological potential (see e.g., Card 1996: 49–71; Sherwin
1996: 49–54). Thus, in the field of ethics and western philosophy
generally the legacy of hierarchical dualism dominates, even in the
work of those who in other contexts seem extraordinarily concerned
with power, subordination, and marginality.
For example, Levinas-inspired ethicists elaborating respon-
sibility for and response to the Other—in ways that echo a feminine
version of caring—have not listened to the feminist call for full con-
sideration of histories of subordination both in theory and lived
experience. In 
 
Closeness: An Ethics
 
 (Jodalen and Vetlesen 1997),
philosophers working in the “ethics of proximity” reassert a kind of
essential human responsiveness in the face of the Other, but dis-
connect the apparently related human traits from sexist and racist
dualisms.
Caring—in particular, feminine trait-based caring—often opposes
concern for self with concern for other (Card 1996), evident when
a self-forgetting caring response is held in contrast to alternative
modes of being. The ethics of closeness, or proximity, emerges from
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a phenomenological conceptual lineage, especially from the apparent
move beyond phenomenology by Levinas. From this perspective,
human beings express their freedom in their response to the Other,
not in a cognitive process, of willing or “taking” responsibility, not
as a matter of contract or reciprocity, but as a precondition to being
human (Jodalen and Vetlesen 1997: 1–19). They write, “Responsi-
bility means to respond, to respond to the call for responsibility
issued wordlessly from the Other and received pre-voluntarily by
the subject” (1997: 9). This formulation, an example of “having”
responsibility, raises an interesting paradox. The manner of response
that a Levinas-inspired intimate ethic lauds is precisely the kind
of response demanded of subordinate being, evoking a traditional
feminine caring or mothering model (see e.g., Gilligan 1982;
Noddings 1984).
Yet, Levinasian responsibility is proposed as simply human (cf.
Borgerson 2001: 82–84; Nietzsche 1998: 36–37). The lack of reflection
upon such essential “responsibility” and, moreover, the failure to
acknowledge the shared oppressions of subordinated peoples leave
crucial domains of ethics untouched by the “bare givenness of
intersubjectivity,” or a Levinas-inspired vision of human relation
(Jodalen and Vetlesen 1997: 7). To put this another way, the one
who must answer 
 
the call
 
 becomes uncritically 
 
feminine
 
, invok-
ing the interrelations of oppressions that share position and
characterization in semiotically and existentially relevant dualistic
hierarchies.
Indeed, work in feminist theory and philosophy of race suggests
that other-centeredness will be recognized most readily in semiotically
associated oppressed groups (Gordon, 1997; Stack 1993). In ignoring
the critical discourse from, specifically, the field of feminist ethics,
proponents of ethical closeness have steered clear of acknowledging
the relation between the mode of being they celebrate and the
actual circumstances of those who have modelled and still model—
willingly or not—those behaviors, regardless of whether there is
anything essentially ethical about them (Bell 1993: 17–48). In other
words, the “proximity ethics” interpretation of Levinas—and argu-
ably Levinas himself—fails to incorporate insights from feminist
ethics into the notion of responsibility based in uncompromising
intersubjectivity, ignoring the ethical implications of being a partic-
ular human being, or kind of agent, in contexts of marginalization,
subordination, and oppression.
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Feminist Ethics is Not Merely a Version of Postmodern Ethics
 
Many of the insights credited to “postmodern ethics,” as discussed
in Crane and Matten (2004; 2007: 115–118), could be derived from
work in feminist ethical theory—as will be discussed later—and
indeed often emerged earlier within feminist thought. In equally
relevant exclusions, critical race theory (e.g., Gordon 1997) and
disability studies (e.g., Shildrick 2005) raise crucial, complex
issues of identity, intersubjectivity, and agency, and—this should
be obvious—not only as a result of specific engagement and ideolog-
ical agreement with poststructural theory or thinkers. Insights that
have emerged from the experiences, innovations, and theorizations
of marginalized groups—such as women, racial minorities, and the
disabled—often ascribed solely to what is known as postmodern
theory and poststructural theorists. Such careless attribution both
reveals and breeds ignorance (and worse) and serves to reintroduce
the marginalization such theory often seeks to acknowledge.
Whereas feminist ethical theory does share some fundamental
assumptions with poststructural theory—a ground for the so-called
postmodern ethics—this emerges not because all feminist theory,
and therefore feminist ethics, is derivative. Rather, many feminist
philosophers and theorists, as well as their critical race theory and
disability studies colleagues, have trained in similar intellectual
traditions—philosophical phenomenology, epistemology, and
semiotics—as, for example, have Foucault, Deleuze, and Derrida
(Borgerson 2005a). Sharing, therefore, academic heritage and dis-
ciplinary genealogies, feminist ethical theory has, in some instances,
exploited derived tools to develop conceptual and practice-based con-
tributions often along the lines of gender, theoretically understood
(Alcoff 1988; Diprose 1994; Walker 1998). Such work includes
attention to the intersecting meanings, instantiations, and func-
tionings of hierarchical dualisms in lived human experience, and
thus has implications beyond gender difference (Borgerson 2001).
Considerable development in various disciplinary territories has
been cultivated with insights derived from theorizing multiple and
particular experiences of living in divergent societies, places, times,
and bodies. Yet, recognition of such fundamental data tends to vanish
in attempts to maintain the status of an abstract and authoritative
voice. Given this observation, it is not surprising that a certain kind
of discourse intimately connected to, and privileged by, this “tradition”
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continues processes of exclusion and marginalization. Focusing
upon feminist ethics as a feminine trait-based ethic of care con-
cerned with “harmonious and healthy social relationships” and
relying upon “personal, subjective reasoning” (Crane and Matten
2004: 98) underestimates and undermines the critical power of
feminist ethics’ analytical examinations and philosophical arguments
around unequal power relations, agency and identity formation,
and systemic subordination. We turn, now, to three key concepts
that emerge from feminist ethics.
 
INSIGHTS FROM FEMINIST ETHICS
 
Recognizing, of course, that conceptual foundations and debates
are as diverse in feminist ethics as in other fields of philosophy, for
present purposes three theoretical signposts will be indicated as
fundamental to feminist ethical terrain. These include attention to
responsibility in conjunction with the recognition of the primacy of
relation—including aspects of co-creative intersubjective agency—
and a focus upon particular experience in context. Whereas alter-
native aspects of feminist ethics’ rich genealogical conceptual heri-
tage could also inspire us here, feminist ethical theories’ reframing
of responsibility, relationships, and experience adequately exem-
plifies new possibilities for the impact, complexity, and potential
of business ethics.
Robin Derry, in particular, has argued that feminist ethical theory,
and related research methods, “could significantly extend the scope
of issues addressed and the depth of learning from research in the
field of business ethics” (Derry 2002, 81). As a brief example, con-
sider elements of an “ethical decision-making process” offered for
business decision making (e.g., Hartman 2001: 6). First, “identify
the dilemma.” Second, “obtain unbiased facts.” Next, identify a vari-
ety of choices; identify stakeholders; then “identify the impact of
each alternative on each stakeholder and the stakeholders’ result-
ing impacts on you and your firm” (Hartman 2001: 6); and so on.
At each of these steps, rich understandings from feminist ethics—
of relationships, responsibility, and experience, as explicated in the
following sections—could provide resources for spurring crucial
inquiry in these ethical investigations. Readers are encouraged to
reflect upon the way in which aspects of relationships, responsibility,
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and experience would expand and in some cases rearticulate
responses to each step of such an ethical decision-making process
checklist (cf. Weston 1992: 12–36).
 
Relationships
 
Traditionally, relationships might be hypothesized as between
autonomous individuals (agents); or between agents who them-
selves are the products of relations and therefore, represent some
modified version of autonomy. Arguments have been made in
business ethics stating that autonomy must be the basis for
ethical action and reflection—with a focus on recognizing the sight of
agency, decision making, and, of course, blame tending to minimize
incidences of multiple influence, manipulation, and chance. How-
ever, reflection on relationships and intersubjectivity’s interference
with autonomy models has provoked alternative articulations of
autonomy (Lippke 1995). For example,
The idea is not that we should involve others in our
deliberations because they will help us come to the right
decision. Rather, because the question is always what to do in
light of the various relationships we have to others, there is
no way of specifying the right decision independent of others’
input. And since the relevant relationships are often reciprocal,
appropriate deliberation must often be collective. (Darwall
1998: 224)
Stephen Darwall points to the distinction between acknowledging
the fundamental role of relationships and accepting a more vulgar
understanding of an almost democratically compromised autonomy.
In a theoretical model of co-creation and development, these
relationships could be understood as formed between the self, or
subject, and some other, in and across a hypothesized gap that
separates these agents and protects their status as independent,
responsibility-bearing decision makers. The interactions and
exchanges form the basis of subject, and self, formation and the
development of relationships over time. Feminist ethical notions of
self/other relations—as Tong’s notion of ontological shifts sug-
gests—are largely intersubjective and interdependent in just this
way: that is, self and other are conceived of as developing in relation
with each other.
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Indeed, calling attention to intersubjectivity and interdependence
raises varying degrees of doubt about the very nature of the dis-
tance that supposedly separates self and other, and this provides a
critical context for interrogating autonomy. In ethical theory, rela-
tionships have often appeared threatening to autonomy and moral
integrity because of the role strict boundaries in individual rational
decision making and choice have played in making one’s decisions
one’s own (see Card 1996: 21–48). Feminist ethical theory faces this
threat to the perceived site of agency, examining and observing
revealed contradictions and emergent insights, yet acknowledging
that relationships—actual or imagined, lived or theoretically con-
ceptualized—form the foundation for notions of responsibility.
Paying greater attention to the fundamental role of relationships
in human existence invokes notions of responsibility to and for others
beyond traditional moral contract-based and principle-justified
duties and obligations. Furthermore, human agents may be conceived
of as “having” or “taking” responsibility. Manifestations of this
discussion are wide ranging and complex, and will be developed
later in the next section.
 
Responsibility
 
As Darwall notes above, human embeddedness in relationships,
our intersubjectivity, cannot be disregarded in discussions and
elaborations of responsibility. Card writes:
The challenge is to show how the importance and point of
responsibility can survive the realization that the quality of our
character and our deeds is not entirely up to us as individuals.
(Card 1996: 22)
Responsibility is often understood to describe an ability to respond
to a situation—whether this involves another person, a group, or
simply a scenario in which one acts to accomplish an action—and
may take the form of recognizing or refusing ties, duties, or obligations
that we have in relation to this world around us. Such a notion may
also be expanded to include possibilities of responsibility to self.
Alternatively, Levinas turns to being-in-relation’s inescapable
sociality, a scenario in which the challenge is to recognize and
accept, as human beings, responsibility for the other in a preexisting
relation (Levinas 1985). This is a case of what Card would call
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“having” rather than “taking” responsibility (Card 1996). For Levinas,
this response scenario is demanded by ethics, the foundational
mode of intersubjectivity, a “face to face” relation of responsibility
for the Other that Levinas calls the “curvature of intersubjective
space” (Levinas 1969: 290–291, cited in Oliver 2001: 204). In this
sense, each must choose to recognize their responsibility, yet there
is no choice about entering into the relationship itself as this
has emerged in “the bare givenness of intersubjectivity.” Ethics, the
condition of the always already existing intersubjectivity, sets the
stage for appropriate modes of responsibility. Whereas Levinas
offers a complex vision of responsibility, its lack of feminist
reflections embeds a troubling lack of boundaries, as discussed
earlier. For now, Card’s notion of “taking” responsibility shall be
the focus.
Card (1996) argues that whereas someone or something may
 
have
 
 responsibility for a set of situations or actions, 
 
taking
 
 respon-
sibility requires a center of agency, a choosing to act or follow
through in a certain way. This has implications in a feminist ethical
context in that females and other subordinated groups may be
perceived as having less agency if they have not chosen their
responsibilities. In other words, being unable to choose one’s
responsibilities, having them thrust upon one, may have ontological
implications. In short, over time, certain groups may be perceived
as unable to “take” responsibility. Diverse scenarios exist: “We may
be given responsibility, assigned it, inherit it, and then accept
or refuse it” (Card 1996: 29). Card continues, “Agents are more
responsible when they take responsibility in a sense that shows
more initiative than when they do not” (29). As Larry May has
argued, tracing “initiatives” and hence responsibility in groups
requires understandings of realms in which shared actions take
place and attitudes and values are transformed (May 1992).
Card designates four different senses of taking responsibility
each with its own related accomplishments (Card 1996: 28):
1.
 
Administrative
 
 or 
 
managerial
 
—estimation and organiz-
ation of possibilities, deciding which should be realized
and how
2.
 
Accountability
 
—being answerable or accountable, either
through specific agreement or “finding” oneself such, for
something and following through
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3.
 
Care-taking
 
—a commitment of support or backing of
something or someone, and holding to the commitment
4.
 
Credit
 
—taking the credit or blame for something that did
or did not happen, “owning up”
Administrative or managerial responsibility clearly involves deci-
sion making, setting out boundaries, and suggesting the form that
various organizational processes will take. Being responsible in the
sense of being “accountable” reflects the position to which others
will turn when decisions have been made, outcomes are under
scrutiny, or results are in. Care-taking here invokes a commitment,
perhaps a promise, to put resources or support behind a person or
project and seeing this through to an end. In other words, one does
not withdraw support from a person or project that is expecting
such, even if perceived outcomes have changed. Taking responsibility
in the sense of credit or blame may evoke not the decision-making
process or following or supporting something through to an end;
rather credit or blame may fall to one outside the general workings
of organizational or institutional processes.
For Card, “having” responsibility cannot generate the same sense
of agency as “taking” it, perhaps undermining the very means by
which responsible actions are produced. In this way, contexts that
encourage “having” rather than “taking” responsibility, may provide
support for unethical behaviors and attitudes. Taking responsibility
requires an active willingness: and what kind of agent manifests
such willingness becomes an issue for investigation. Of course,
some people, or agents, may not be willing to “take” responsibility
in these ways if as a result they incur more burdens or blame
than they would have had otherwise. There is, then, a potential flight
from responsibility—or bad faith—that remains troubling. Levinas,
for example, engages this concern, attempting to place ethics and
relations of responsibility beyond human choice. Feminist ethics,
instead, tends to elaborate on being a certain kind of agent, and,
thus, having particular kinds of experiences.
 
Experience
Knowledge gained through experience in situations not generally
regarded as morally relevant nevertheless generates ways of function-
ing and modes of decision making that have broad ethical import.
Feminist ethics has taken a special interest in the understandings
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acquired by particular, often marginalized, groups and individuals.
Ethical investigations that include such perspectives require listen-
ing to others’ voices and emphasizing a broader acknowledgement
of human interaction and attention to the lives people lead.
As Iris Marion Young has noted, descriptions of experience
express “a subject’s doing and undergoing from the point of view of
the subject” (Young 1990: 13). Therefore, “talk about experience
expresses subjectivity, describes the feelings, motives, and reactions
of subjects as they affect and are affected by the context in which
they are situated” (Young: 13). Vikki Bell discusses experience in
conjunction with the notion of embodiment (Bell 1999: 113–138). In
the sense that in the past, notions of embodiment were understood
as invoking an essentialist stance, Bell argues that “being ‘anti-
essentialist’ need not be a reason not to consider the phenomena
and import of embodiment” (Bell: 132). She suggests theorizing “the
body in a way that captures the import of the proximity of the body,
the debt of identity to the body” (Bell 1999: 132). Echoing this
recognition of the impact of particular histories and position on a
subject’s perspective, Grimshaw writes, “Ethical concerns and
priorities arise from different forms of social life” (Grimshaw 1993: 42).
Experience emerges through and with diverse and nonsubstitutable
modes of embodiment.
Feminist ethical theory may push us to critically reflect on a pheno-
menon rather than simply assume its merits, and hence interrogate
the emergence and effects, for example, of “ethical sensitivity.” May
has argued that sensitivity to the lives of others and their particular
experiences can serve as an opening to acting ethically in relation
(May 1992). Whereas sensitivity to others has often been under-
stood as feminine gender’s domain, May does not find such an
essentialized limitation necessary, rather regarding sensitivity a
basic human capacity that can be cultivated.
Recalling Hobbes’ statement in The Leviathan, May points out
that the opportunity to learn and develop from experience is one of
the fundamental equalities that exists in the state of nature (May
1992: 130). Clearly, such an opportunity is altered by prevailing
experiential circumstances: and ultimately, some people seem to learn
more than others from the lessons of their lives and even succeed in
applying these to solve future dilemmas. Moreover, there is no guarantee
that the lessons learned point toward “ethical” behavior and actions,
sensitive or otherwise, as life is not an ethically reliable teacher.
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Focus on acknowledgment of lived experience and learning
invites a distinction between the “natural” and “unnatural” condi-
tions under which people make choices including recognition of
how histories of oppression circumscribe the contexts in which
relationships and responsibility emerge. Card writes, “It is not
enough to confront the inequities of the ‘natural lottery’ from which
we may inherit various physical and psychological assets and liabil-
ities. It is important also to reflect on the unnatural lottery created
by networks of unjust institutions and histories that bequeath to us
further inequities in our starting positions and that violate princi-
ples that would have addressed, if not redressed, inequities of
nature” (Card 1996: 20). Being born into a situation may be a “nat-
ural fact,” but how the nation or race into which one is born has
been treated historically and how various effects emerging from
these historical variables will place a newborn are not natural facts.
Contingent—though not necessarily accidental—historical circum-
stances, shaped and held in place by systems of power and status,
may be ascribed to the just and unjust functioning of “institutions”:
Such institutions may be as intimately related to an individual as
her family relations, her skin color, and her gender. The following
section explicates the impact these insights from feminist ethics
could have on research in business ethics.
SHARED RESEARCH CONCERNS: REVISITING 
“ETHICAL SENSITIVITY”
To explore further feminist ethics’ potential to impact research
being done in the field of business ethics, I turn to the example of
“ethical sensitivity.” The Journal of Business Ethics has given wit-
ness to the role that ethical sensitivity plays in ethical dilemmas in
business contexts (Collins 2000). As suggested in the introduction
to this essay, feminist ethical theory opens understanding around
the issue of “ethical sensitivity,” offering insight into, and tools to
address, the concern that “many gender studies lack a theoretical
framework that predicts when and why women are more ethically
sensitive than men” (Collins 2000: 11). The emphasis upon relation-
ships, responsibility, and lived experience found in feminist ethics
provides penetration into the realm of business that traditional
moral theories may fail to accomplish.
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Ethical sensitivity has often been examined in terms of gender
differences, in particular, an interest in whether women’s so-called
feminine characteristics, including caring traits, form the founda-
tion for greater ethical sensitivity. As Collins has noted, the results
and conclusions have been mixed (see e.g., Shultz and Brender-
Ilan 2004: 305–6). However, conceptual innovations and analysis
motivated by feminist ethics suggest that ethical sensitivity could
be studied as a matter of attention to certain details, more obvious,
compelling, and relevant to some ethical agents than to others.
Recall that feminist ethical conceptualizations support the
conclusion that context matters. To put this another way, feminist
ethical theory encourages us to explore why it is that agents with
experience of certain kinds—for example, a lived awareness of
intersubjectivity and particularity arising in daily life practices and
culturally socialized ways of being still regularly expected of and
manifested in women in contemporary Western cultures—are more
likely to be ethically sensitive. (What such agents ultimately do,
of course, is a different question.)
The contributions of feminist ethics push us beyond an essen-
tialist view of gender difference—that bases female predilection for
ethical sensitivity in an unfathomable natural, “intuitive,” or even
cognitive, difference—to conceive, perceive, and construct alternative
and supplementary understandings that can be mobilized, theorized,
and applied in future scenarios. Thus, the phenomenon of ethical
sensitivity emerges as an outcome of specific epistemological and
ontological assumptions and cultural preconceptions that play out
in lived experience of being female, or conversely male, at a historically
specific time and place. In short, ethical sensitivity derives from
experience generally and, further, out of experience in relationships
of responsibility with others. Such critical reflection gives us a
depth of perspective regarding ethical tendencies and traits. The
next section investigates three feminist ethicists in action.
FEMINIST ETHICS IN ACTION: THREE EXAMPLES
As suggested above, feminist ethics in many ways preceded business
ethics into areas now recognized as of concern to business ethics
and corporate social responsibility, such as complex relations of power
between unequal parties. Feminist ethicists drew upon theoretical
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insights derived from bringing to bear notions of responsibility,
relationships and experience informed by the challenging, shifting,
and reformulating of basic ontological and epistemological assump-
tions. Examples from the work of three prominent feminist ethicists,
Claudia Card, Margaret Urban Walker, and Iris Marion Young are
offered to demonstrate the way feminist ethical insights inform
analysis, articulation, and intervention in the world—past, present,
and future.
The context and depth of these philosophers’ theoretical work is
far greater than can be expressed in brief here. Readers are encour-
aged to seek out the writings of these and other feminist ethicists on
their own. Moreover, insofar as bioethics engages critical contours
of business and organizational practices the works of feminist
bioethicists such as Tong, Sherwin, and Wolf are indispensable
(e.g., Sherwin 1996; Tong 1997; Wolf 1996).
Claudia Card: Harm and “Grey Zones”
Card, a student of John Rawls, demonstrates in The Atrocity Para-
digm (2002) philosophical strengths gleaned from charting and
developing the concepts, dimensions, and ultimately the field of
feminist ethics. She defines “evil” most basically as “foreseeable
intolerable harms produced by culpable wrongdoing” (Card 2002:
3). She writes, “One reason that many evils go unrecognized is that
the source of harm is an institution, not just the intentions or
choices of individuals (many of whom may not share the goals of the
institution, even when their conduct is governed by its norms).
Another is that the harm is the product of many acts, some of which
might have been individually harmless in other contexts. Victims
are more likely than perpetrators to appreciate the harm. But when
the source is an institution, even victims can be hard-pressed to
know whom to hold accountable” (Card 2002: 24–25). Particularly
in situations in which privilege meets disadvantage, wealth meets
poverty, or power meets constraint—constantly emerging for example
in globalized labor, or international health research practices
(Borgerson 2005b)—decision-making processes to avoid real harms
in the face of apparent benefits become ever more opaque.
“Feminists,” writes Card, “have long struggled with the question
of how ethically responsible agency is possible under oppression,
given that oppressive practices are coercive” (Card 2002: 234). In
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her discussion of “the grey zone,” Card elaborates on “the complex
and difficult predicaments of some who are simultaneously victims
and perpetrators.” Such a situation might be seen arising in a rural
community adjusting, for example, to the presence of new out-
sourced factory work in which some people come to hold the means
of survival for others, perhaps suddenly, perhaps with nearly
impossible demands from those further up the supply chain. What
Card argues is that, “evils may be prevented from perpetuating
themselves in a potentially unending chain as long as victims who
face grim alternatives continue to distinguish between bad and
worse and refuse, insofar as possible, to abdicate responsibility
for one another” (Card 2002: 26). Some of her analysis specifically
addresses social institutions; nevertheless discussions of “institu-
tions” might as well suggest the organization or corporation. Card
argues that institutions that create “grey zones,” sometimes
intentionally, are particularly culpable.
Margaret Urban Walker: Moral Understandings and 
Representational Practices
Walker contends that the assumption that people are a kind or type
is propagated and created by representational practices, which “are
among those that construct socially salient identities for people”
(Walker 1998: 178). She argues that if practices of representation
“affect some people’s morally significant perceptions of and inter-
actions with other people, and if they can contribute to those percep-
tions or interactions going seriously wrong, these activities have
bearing on fundamental ethical questions” (p. 179). That is, a person
influenced by such images may treat members of the represented
group as less than human or undeserving of moral recognition.
Drawing upon and developing such insights allow marketing
communications scholars to articulate the way in which represen-
tations are part of lived experience. Representations from advertis-
ing images, film, and the Internet inform and co-create notions
of reality. Mobilizing an “ethics of representation” can sensitize
international marketing campaigns to their interactions with, and
impact upon cultural difference, global race relations, and the
constitution of the consuming subjects (Ahmed 2000; Borgerson
and Schroeder 2002, 2005; Chouliaraki 2006; Schroeder and Borg-
erson 2005).
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Philosophers concerned with ethical norms and behavior have
traditionally proceeded as though all problematic situations of
moral recognition could be countered in three ways: through con-
structive definitions of personhood, through formal requirements of
universality or universalizability, and through substantial demands
for impartial or equal consideration (Walker 1998). From Walker’s
feminist ethical perspective, these three formulations lack sufficient
conceptual strength to handle representations that characteristi-
cally manipulate and damage the identity of subordinate groups.
Moreover, these prescriptions fail to provide sufficiently complex
considerations to deal with problems of representation and, worse,
damaging representations often fail to even qualify as ethical or
moral problems.
Not surprisingly, then, we find in Robert Solomon’s chapter on busi-
ness ethics a discussion of “consumer intelligence and responsibility”
including issues of advertising. The use of “sex”—apparently refer-
ring to displayed sexuality—to lend appeal to products and “the
offensive portrayals of women and minorities” become a “lack of
taste”: But, asks Solomon, is it “an ethical issue?” What Solomon
utterly misses here is advertising’s role beyond appeal, information,
and persuasion, its perpetual representation of an entire vision
of life and the world around us, often provoking responses and
consequences equivalent to and as “serious” as “outright lying
in advertising” (Solomon 1993: 362; cf. Borgerson and Schroeder 2002;
Schroeder and Borgerson 2005; Vaver 2008; Schroeder 2008).
Iris Marion Young: Asymmetrical Reciprocity
Young addresses the issue of attempting to understand “the point
of view of others before drawing conclusions about what is right or
just,” for example in encouraging a more privileged group to fairly
consider the importance of some benefit to a less privileged group.
Believing in the potential for dialog between people that happens
“across difference without reversing perspectives and identifying
with each other” Young finds the common sense thought experiment
of “putting yourself in the place of the other” not only misleading
and politically suspect, but reinforcing “subjective understanding
of issues,” disregarding the “nonsubstitutable relation of moral
subjects” and disrupting opportunities for what she calls enlarged
thought (Young 1997: 39).
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This response to work on theories of communicative ethics
invokes “asymmetrical reciprocity” based on a subject’s unique
temporality and position, and moreover recognition of asymme-
try of power, opportunities, and understandings. Young writes,
“with regard to the Hegelian ontology of self and other, each social
position is structured by the configuration of relationships among
positions. Persons may flow and shift among structured social posi-
tions, and the positions themselves may flow and shift, but the
positions cannot be plucked from their contextualized relations
and substituted for one another” (Young 1997: 52). Work in business
ethics and corporate social responsibility that requires “efforts to
express experience and values from different perspectives”—as dis-
cussions between corporations and countries do—may take note of
the dangers of collapsing diverse perspectives and experiences
into “shared” expectations. Furthermore, recognition of inequalities,
and the opportunities they offer, may help build understandings,
for example, of the way trust works, or does not, in corporate and
organizational environments (e.g., Gustafsson 2005).
This article has sought to clarify what business ethics can learn
from feminist ethics—understood in a robust way that makes an
educated exploration of resources beyond care ethics and uncritical
notions of femininity. The introduction of three feminist ethicists in
action attempts to bring to light notions that business ethics and
corporate social responsibility might find useful. Nevertheless, this
is only a brief sketch, and the true benefits of engaging with
feminist ethics, as with most areas of philosophy, may only emerge
with further reading and reflection.
CONCLUSION
As has been suggested here, feminist ethics in many ways preceded
business ethics into areas of concern that business ethics and cor-
porate social responsibility now seek to engage in. This includes the
work of feminist ethics in developing theoretical and conceptual
resources for charting courses through these complex, often unarti-
culated, realms.
Feminist ethics does more than displace traditional ethical
voices, only to assert a “different” voice with alternative concerns.
As illustrated in the preceding discussions, simply asserting the
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primacy of relationships, recognizing the existence of permeable
boundaries between the self and the other, and questioning the site
of agency may fail to attend to the existential-phenomenological
realities of intersubjectivity and responsibility—including issues of
power—that shed light on business ethics and organizational environ-
ments. This requires noting both in theorizing, and in day-to-day
life experience, that lack of boundaries between self and other—as
evoked in the case of Levinas’ ethics, but also often in some care
ethics and feminine ethics—may have dangerous effects and, more-
over, forms the typical situation of oppressed groups.
Furthermore, an insistence on residing closer to understandings
of lived experience may have a particular attraction challenging—
yet making sense to—those who work in business contexts, and
who can be expected to invoke on-site experience-based insights
that traditionally trained business ethicists may lack. The underes-
timation of feminist ethics in business ethics could be viewed as in
unfortunate continuity with modes of privileged, traditional philo-
sophical discourse that have ignored, excluded, and subordinated
marginalized alternative views of identity, society, and the world for
centuries. However, business ethics, a field with its own shadowed
subordinations and feminized margins, may well defy the under-
estimation of feminist ethics, recognizing powerful philosophical
opportunities and conceptual innovations in the potentially harmo-
nious landscape of feminist ethics and business ethics.
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